My regular readers know that I almost always support the actions of president Obama. The current decision however is an unambiguous example of mission creep. The entire approach to the war is a case of a Johnsonian desire to make a problem go away by ignoring it. At the outset of the conflict the president refused to make any commitments; then the UN elite began to fret about massacres and, a recurring theme, WMDs. The president, perceiving a way to avoid the problem, drew a “red line” stating that the use of WMDs would entail a military response. This meant by implication that the president would not have to act or involve himself in the matter so long as this red line was not crossed. Further the administration had to be pretty confident that Bashar Assad would not utilize his gas arsenal; the risk of the US military outweighed any other concerns.
Policy makers did not realize that the threat to the Shiite Assad administration from its largely Sunni subjects comprised a far more deadly threat than the US Air Force. Faced with a deteriorating strategic position, someone pulled the trigger. The president then found himself in a very awkward position. He vacillated between commitment to his word and what he thinks would have been the best decision. Surprisingly Russian president Vladimir Putin, so that he could resurrect Russia's position as a great power, came to the rescue. Putin proposed a compromise deal under which Syria's chemical arsenal would be removed in return for peace.
Nonetheless this deal did nothing to enhance Assad's military position. In a Middle Eastern country made up largely of Sunnis angry with a hostile government, the predictable occurred. They formed a brutal and effective military force. Policy makers, suffering under the Geneva Illusion that world conditions are capable of fulfilling elite western expectations, found themselves confronted with reality. Meanwhile bureaucrats at the Department of Defense had probably delighted in excess at the possibility of weakening an Iranian ally, Assad, during our nuclear negotiations with Tehran.
Now confronted with the growth of ISIS, the US slowly ramped up military operations against the terrorists while refusing to aid the Assad government. Recently Russia interfered again, launching air strikes in support of Assad. Now the president has deployed ground forces.
Western policy makers continue searching for a more appealing third party in the conflict. Inconveniently the Kurds are incapable of ruling the entirety of Syria. Meanwhile the Genevans' moderate Sunnis failed to materialize after the Pentagon managed to find less than 200 potential fighters possessing ideological orthodoxy—this as part of a budgeted $500 million program.
That leaves two groups capable of governing Syria: ISIS and the Assad government. At one point we could have possibly tried to moderate and reach a peaceful accommodation with ISIS however our current military operations have made this impossible. That leaves the Shiite administration. Having reached a nuclear deal with Tehran we no longer need fear implications from that area. What’s more concerning is the goodwill president Putin has built up amongst Assad’s followers.
US diplomats have proposed a resolution that would initially leave Assad in the presidency to be followed by elections for a successor. Predictably this has not gone over well in Moscow. A better course would be to find a way to remove Assad himself while supporting a replacement whom the world perceives as more liberal. Then we must remove Assad without losing any more loyalty from his followers and pushing them closer to Moscow. One option is a covert assassination, blamed on ISIS. This is the most attractive solution but suffers from the drawback that any mistakes would gravely worsen the situation. Likewise a US ally, perhaps Israel or Turkey, could kill Assad by airstrike. Again it might be hard to distance ourselves from responsibility. Perhaps the best approach would be to directly work with Iran. Tehran given its relationship with the Syrian government might bring Assad into a non-consensual retirement while elevating one of his generals. The Iranians might be persuaded to do this if it were seen as the best way to maintain Shiite control over Syria. Similarly Iran would want to cooperate in propping up our allied Shiite led government in Baghdad as would Shiites in Syria. Israel could be bought off with more weapons. Meanwhile our Geneva Illusion sufferers at the State Department could do what they do best: soothe Saudi Arabia.
